feat: 核心模块增强 — 加密 + 运行时配置 + 日志缓冲

- crypto.py: API Key 加密/解密工具
- runtime_config.py: 运行时动态配置管理
- log_buffer.py: 内存日志缓冲区
- config.py: 新增加密配置项
- http_client.py: 增强重试和错误处理
This commit is contained in:
shangfangjian
2026-09-19 11:58:03 +08:00
parent b3e2c52b49
commit 786f10aa11
57 changed files with 3178 additions and 488 deletions
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"""运行时配置:数据库优先,回落 .env。
后台「数据源」页可在线修改的配置项存 app_settings 表;
读取时 DB 有值用 DB,否则回落同名环境变量(pydantic settings)。
DB 读取失败时也回落环境变量,保证采集不因管理表故障而中断。
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import secrets
from dataclasses import dataclass
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import insert as pg_insert
from src.core import crypto
from src.core.config import settings
from src.db.base import AsyncSessionLocal
from src.db.models import AppSetting
# 管理员密码哈希在 app_settings 中的键(不进 SETTING_DEFS 白名单:
# 只能走专门的改密接口 —— 需验证当前密码,不能被通用配置接口绕过)
ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH_KEY = "ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH"
# .env 明文密码的键名(仅作为初始值;后台改密后以哈希为准)
_ADMIN_ENV_KEY = "ADMIN_PASSWORD"
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SettingDef:
key: str
label: str
description: str
sensitive: bool
# 允许在后台查看/修改的配置项白名单(之外的 key 一律拒绝读写)
SETTING_DEFS: dict[str, SettingDef] = {
"BZZOIRO_KEY": SettingDef(
"BZZOIRO_KEY", "Bzzoiro API Key", "比赛赛程 / 比分数据源凭证", sensitive=True,
),
"BZZOIRO_BASE": SettingDef(
"BZZOIRO_BASE", "Bzzoiro API 地址", "Bzzoiro 接口基础地址", sensitive=False,
),
"API_FOOTBALL_KEY": SettingDef(
"API_FOOTBALL_KEY", "API-Football Key", "伤停数据源凭证(api-sports)", sensitive=True,
),
"LLM_API_KEY": SettingDef(
"LLM_API_KEY", "LLM API Key", "大模型服务凭证(OpenAI 兼容接口)", sensitive=True,
),
"LLM_BASE_URL": SettingDef(
"LLM_BASE_URL", "LLM 接口地址", "如 https://api.deepseek.com/v1", sensitive=False,
),
"LLM_MODEL": SettingDef(
"LLM_MODEL", "LLM 模型", "如 deepseek-chat / gpt-4o", sensitive=False,
),
}
# ── 按角色独立配置 LLM 的键(5 专家 + 终裁) ──
# 每个角色可独立覆盖 模型 / 接口地址 / API Key;留空继承分层默认(见 orchestrator._agent_provider)。
AGENT_META: list[dict] = [
{"id": "form", "label": "近期状态分析专家"},
{"id": "stats", "label": "攻防数据分析专家"},
{"id": "home_away", "label": "主客因素分析专家"},
{"id": "injuries", "label": "阵容完整性分析专家"},
{"id": "h2h", "label": "历史交锋分析专家"},
{"id": "aggregator", "label": "终裁分析专家"},
]
for _agent in AGENT_META:
_u = _agent["id"].upper()
SETTING_DEFS[f"AGENT_{_u}_MODEL"] = SettingDef(
f"AGENT_{_u}_MODEL", f"{_agent['label']} 模型", "留空继承默认(专家层/全局)", sensitive=False,
)
SETTING_DEFS[f"AGENT_{_u}_BASE_URL"] = SettingDef(
f"AGENT_{_u}_BASE_URL", f"{_agent['label']} 接口地址", "留空继承全局 LLM_BASE_URL", sensitive=False,
)
SETTING_DEFS[f"AGENT_{_u}_API_KEY"] = SettingDef(
f"AGENT_{_u}_API_KEY", f"{_agent['label']} API Key", "留空继承全局 LLM_API_KEY", sensitive=True,
)
def mask_value(value: str, sensitive: bool) -> str:
"""脱敏展示:敏感值只留末 4 位;非敏感值原样返回。"""
if not value:
return ""
if not sensitive:
return value
return f"****{value[-4:]}" if len(value) >= 8 else "****"
async def get_runtime_value(key: str) -> str:
"""读运行时配置:DB 覆盖值 → .env 默认值 → 空串。
敏感项入库时是密文,读出后自动解密;旧明文(迁移前)由 decrypt_value 透传。
"""
defn = SETTING_DEFS.get(key)
try:
async with AsyncSessionLocal() as db:
row = await db.get(AppSetting, key)
if row and row.value:
value = crypto.decrypt_value(row.value) if defn and defn.sensitive else row.value
if value:
return value
except Exception:
logger.warning("读取运行时配置 %s 失败,回落环境变量", key)
return getattr(settings, key, "") or ""
async def set_runtime_value(key: str, value: str) -> None:
"""写入/更新 DB 覆盖值(调用方需先校验 key 在白名单内)。
敏感项(SETTING_DEFS.sensitive)以 Fernet 加密存储,库里不落明文。
"""
defn = SETTING_DEFS.get(key)
stored = crypto.encrypt_value(value) if defn and defn.sensitive else value
async with AsyncSessionLocal() as db:
stmt = pg_insert(AppSetting).values(key=key, value=stored)
stmt = stmt.on_conflict_do_update(index_elements=["key"], set_={"value": stored})
await db.execute(stmt)
await db.commit()
logger.info("运行时配置 %s 已更新", key)
async def clear_runtime_value(key: str) -> None:
"""删除 DB 覆盖值,回落 .env(调用方需先校验 key 在白名单内)。"""
async with AsyncSessionLocal() as db:
row = await db.get(AppSetting, key)
if row is not None:
await db.delete(row)
await db.commit()
logger.info("运行时配置 %s 已清除覆盖", key)
async def get_setting_origin(key: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""返回 (origin, 当前生效值)。origin ∈ db / env / none。"""
defn = SETTING_DEFS.get(key)
try:
async with AsyncSessionLocal() as db:
row = await db.get(AppSetting, key)
if row and row.value:
value = crypto.decrypt_value(row.value) if defn and defn.sensitive else row.value
return "db", value
except Exception:
logger.warning("读取运行时配置 %s 来源失败,按环境变量处理", key)
env_value = getattr(settings, key, "") or ""
return ("env", env_value) if env_value else ("none", "")
async def migrate_plaintext_sensitive_settings() -> int:
"""一次性迁移:把库中仍是明文的敏感项加密(幂等,启动时执行)。
返回加密的条数。
"""
migrated = 0
sensitive_keys = {k for k, d in SETTING_DEFS.items() if d.sensitive}
async with AsyncSessionLocal() as db:
rows = (await db.execute(select(AppSetting))).scalars().all()
for row in rows:
if row.key not in sensitive_keys or crypto.is_encrypted(row.value):
continue
row.value = crypto.encrypt_value(row.value)
migrated += 1
await db.commit()
if migrated:
logger.info("已加密迁移 %d 条明文敏感配置", migrated)
return migrated
# ── 管理员密码:只存 scrypt 哈希,永不存明文 ──────────────────────
async def get_admin_password_hash() -> str:
"""库中管理员密码哈希;无则空串。"""
try:
async with AsyncSessionLocal() as db:
row = await db.get(AppSetting, ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH_KEY)
return row.value if row else ""
except Exception:
logger.warning("读取管理员密码哈希失败")
return ""
async def set_admin_password_hash(hash_str: str) -> None:
async with AsyncSessionLocal() as db:
stmt = pg_insert(AppSetting).values(key=ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH_KEY, value=hash_str)
stmt = stmt.on_conflict_do_update(index_elements=["key"], set_={"value": hash_str})
await db.execute(stmt)
await db.commit()
logger.info("管理员密码哈希已更新")
async def verify_admin_password(candidate: str) -> bool:
"""校验管理员密码:优先哈希;哈希不存在时回落 .env 明文(未迁移的旧部署)。"""
stored_hash = await get_admin_password_hash()
if stored_hash:
return crypto.verify_password(candidate, stored_hash)
env_pw = getattr(settings, _ADMIN_ENV_KEY, "") or ""
return bool(env_pw) and secrets.compare_digest(candidate, env_pw)
async def get_admin_credential_fingerprint() -> str:
"""管理员凭证指纹(作为会话签名密钥的输入)。
用密码哈希而非密码本身:凭证变化 → 指纹变化 → 全部会话失效。
"""
stored_hash = await get_admin_password_hash()
if stored_hash:
return f"hash:{stored_hash}"
env_pw = getattr(settings, _ADMIN_ENV_KEY, "") or ""
return f"env:{env_pw}" if env_pw else ""
async def _get_raw_setting(key: str) -> str:
async with AsyncSessionLocal() as db:
row = await db.get(AppSetting, key)
return row.value if row else ""
async def _delete_setting(key: str) -> None:
async with AsyncSessionLocal() as db:
row = await db.get(AppSetting, key)
if row is not None:
await db.delete(row)
await db.commit()
async def ensure_admin_password_hashed() -> bool:
"""启动迁移:确保管理员密码只以 scrypt 哈希存在(幂等)。
迁移来源优先级:
1. 库中旧版明文 ADMIN_PASSWORD 行(旧代码写入的当前密码,迁移后删除该明文行)
2. .env 的 ADMIN_PASSWORD 初始值
"""
if await get_admin_password_hash():
# 哈希已存在:清除旧版可能残留的明文行
if await _get_raw_setting(_ADMIN_ENV_KEY):
await _delete_setting(_ADMIN_ENV_KEY)
logger.info("已删除遗留的明文 ADMIN_PASSWORD 行(哈希已存在)")
return False
legacy_plain = await _get_raw_setting(_ADMIN_ENV_KEY)
if legacy_plain:
await set_admin_password_hash(crypto.hash_password(legacy_plain))
await _delete_setting(_ADMIN_ENV_KEY)
logger.info("已将库中明文管理员密码迁移为 scrypt 哈希,明文行已删除")
return True
env_pw = getattr(settings, _ADMIN_ENV_KEY, "") or ""
if not env_pw:
return False
await set_admin_password_hash(crypto.hash_password(env_pw))
logger.info(
"已将 .env 中的明文管理员密码迁移为 scrypt 哈希。"
"建议现在从 .env 中删除 ADMIN_PASSWORD 明文行。"
)
return True